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Abstract
Ranaweera  presents an internally  consistent  policy implementation  strategy. He finds that an
macroeconomic  framework that could be used as  a first  aggressive adjustment policy would indeed  improve most
step toward a more comprehensive  quantitative  and  performance  and welfare  indicators. Two major
qualitative  assessment  of the adjustment alternatives  ingredients  of such an aggressive adjustment  strategy are
facing Uzbekistan.  The three-gap framework  focuses on  the unification  of the exchange  rate and implementation
the major imbalances  of the economy for evaluating  of current account convertibility  in the balance  of
policy choices facing Uzbekistan.  It emphasizes  the  payments.  The author also draws attention to the relative
domestic and external factors that determine  economic  importance  of external financing and the sustainability  of
outcomes and welfare. The author attempts to quantify  the balance of payments under alternative structural
two policy scenarios-gradual  as against an accelerated  adjustment paths  facing Uzbekistan.
This paper-a product of the Development  Data Group, Development Economics  Senior Vice Presidency-is part of an
ongoing effort in the group to improve quantitative analytical  tools for country assistance strategies.  Copies of the paper
are available free from the World Bank,  1818  H Street NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  Please contact Premi Rathan  Raj,
room MC2-742, telephone 202-473-3705, fax 202-522-3645, email address prathanraj@worldbank.org.  Policy Research
Working  Papers  are  also  posted  on  the  Web  at  http://econ.worldbank.org.  The  author  may  be  contacted  at
tranaweera@worldbank.org.  October 2003.  (29 pages)
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paper  are entirely those of the autbors. They do not necessarily represent the viewJ of the World Bank, its Executive Directors,  or the
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1.0.  Introduction
Since its independence  in 1991, Uzbekistan, a successor state of the former Soviet
Union (FSU) in Central  Asia, has followed  a unique path to economic transition.  At the time
of independence,  the country's relatively rich resource endowment,  low degree of over-
industrialization  and trade dependence,  large share of agriculture in aggregate output,  and the
predominance of cotton and other raw materials in exports, pointed to a relatively better
transition path (in comparison with other FSU countries) to a market-based  system. Rather
than embracing the "shock" therapy  favored by the "Washington  consensus" that has been
tried in other Eastern European countries such as Poland, Uzbekistan has adopted  a unique
transition strategy of promoting stability and equality through a state-controlled  gradual
transition strategy.  This goal is pursued by subsidizing employment,  controlling prices on
essential  items, privatizing large enterprises  gradually, and attempting to attain self-
sufficiency in energy and food supplies. Although no clear characterization  of this strategy
exists, it could be broadly considered as some form of "gradualism"  to economic transition.2
Following this path in recent times, Uzbekistan was able to achieve modest growth
and a  modicum of macroeconomic  stability by 1999 with inflation down to about 45 percent
per year, the budget deficit reduced to about -2.5 percent of GDP, and the current account
deficit under -2 percent of GDP.  In the year 2000, Uzbekistan  started to address its
fundamental  imbalance in the foreign exchange  market by devaluing its currency by 50
percent in May and by announcing a series of other measures to ease the supply and demand
for foreign exchange.  Having made this turnaround,  the policymakers  faced a choice between
(i) accelerating  the pace of foreign exchange liberalization with the intention of unifying the
2 For example,  in comparison with China  and Hungary,  this strategy is perceived to be relatively less  orthodox gradualism.4
exchange  market and introducing current account converdbility as soon as possible or (ii)
continuing with a slower and more deliberate pace of foreign exchange liberalization,
deferring convertibility  to some future year.  The policy makers seem to have chosen the latter
path as evidenced by piecemeal changes that have been made to the existing foreign exchange
system periodically.  It turns out that this decision is central to the choice of macroeconomic,
social, and structural policies, which would need to be implemented to complement foreign
exchange liberalization.  The path that Uzbekistan chooses would determine the extent to
which it is able to capitalize  on many of its inherent economic  strengths, accelerate growth,
and improve living standards of its people.
This study provides an intemally consistent macroeconomic framework that focuses
on the major imbalances of  the economy for evaluating some of the policy choices facing
Uzbekistan.  It lays emphasis  on both the domestic and the external factors that determine
economic  performance. The study also attempts to quantify the relative importance of
external financing and the sustainability  of the balance of payments  under alternative
structural adjustment paths facing Uzbekistan. The three-gap framework presented here is
intended as a first step toward a more comprehensive qualitative and quantitative assessment
of the adjustment altematives facing Uzbekistan.
The study  is organized  as follows:  In section 2, the major developments in Uzbelcistan
are described with particular emphasis on developments  since the breakdown of the USSR.
Section 3 is devoted to the discussion of the three-gap model used in the study.  In section 4,
two main adjustment scenarios are analyzed.  Section 5 draws together some conclusions of
the study.5
2.0  Major Macroeconomic  Developments  Since Independence
The transition process  in Uzbekistan has so far been rather uneven (see, EBRD
(1998), Fischer,  Sahay,  and Vegh (1997), De Melo,  Denizer, Gelb, and  Tenev (1997),
Spechler (2000), World Bank (1999)).  Beginning in early  1992, Uzbekistan has evolved
through three different transition phases, which are very different  from each other in terms
of macroeconomic policies followed by the government,  progress made in the
implementation of market-oriented  reforms, and stability of the macroeconomic  situation.
During the first phase, covering the period 1992-93,  the government  seemed to have
followed rather loose macroeconomic policies, the implementation  of market-oriented
reforms was limited in scope and slow, and the macroeconomic  imbalances inherited  from
the FSU deteriorated  markedly.  During the second phase,  which covered the period from
early 1994 to the 3d quarter of 1996, macroeconomic  performance  improved  considerably
perhaps as a result of the tightening of financial policies and the acceleration of many
market-oriented reforms.  The third phase covers the period from the 4t  quarter of 1996 to
the present,  and is characterized  by occasional  loosening of macroeconomic  policies, a
reversal of some key reforms while maintaining sustained progress in others, and the
worsening of the external imbalances  (see table 1 for some key macroeconomic indicators
for Uzbekistan during the period 1997-2002).
The macroeconomic  situation continued to be difficult during the early years of
2000. Low gold prices, large debt service payments, the restrictive  foreign exchange and
trade regime, and the overvalued exchange rate continued to put pressure on the balance of
payments.  The rebound of gold prices in the year 2002 somewhat helped to ease the6
country's balance of payments.  On the other hand, the decline in cotton prices resulted in
the balance  of payments remaining tight.  Nevertheless,  preliminary  estimates show that in
2002, the balance of payments current account deficit was marginally lower than in 2001.
Government's consolidated budget deficit is estimated to have increased  to about -2.1
percent of GDP due largely to an increase in current expenditures  (see table  1).
The most significant policy changes so far were in the area of exchange rates. On
May 1, 2000, the  official and commercial bank exchange rates against the US dollar were
unified at the level of  the comnmercial bank rate.  As a result, the spread between the new
official rate and the curb market rate was reduced by almost 20 percent.  In the first half of
2002, access for individuals to the cash foreign exchange  market and to the over-the-counter
(OTC) market was somewhat liberalized.  However,  the multiple rate system continues to
exist, and the long-awaited full unification of the exchange  rate has not been carried out so
far (see chart  I on page 28).
3.0  Chairmeteirstiics  nmd  Structure oT the UzlbeMastnm Model3
The three-gap model  is considered to be particularly useful for analyzing the policy
problems faced by the Uzbekistan economy. The three-gap approach emphasizes domestic
savings and investment constraints, foreign  savings and capital inflows, and fiscal constraints
to growth and structural adjustment (see, Bacha (1990), Taylor (1990), Sepheri, Moshiri, and
Doudongee (2000), Iqbal (1995,  1997,  2000) for a variety of three-gap models)
The particular version of the three-gap model applied to Uzbekistan belongs to the
family of models used by many international organizations  and govermnent agencies for
macroeconomic  work on developing countries.  This framework,  which is based on a
3 For a brief description  of the model, see the appendix.7
consistent flow-of-funds among multiple economic  agents in an economy, facilitates the
exploration of different policy options open to a country. The original "gap" models were
designed to calculate the need for additional  foreign savings to close the so-called
savings/investment  gap and/or were used to calculate the additional foreign exchange
requirements  for purchasing the imports that were critically needed in the growth process.
4. 0.  Simulations with the model4
We use the model to examine two alternative scenarios  for the economy of
Uzbekistan.  In the "base case" scenario, we focus on the continuation of the present policy
stance with no significant gains in growth and inflation fronts.  In the recent past, this
"gradualist" approach to adjustment has been characterized  by a "stop-go" cycle of reforms
and backtracking to deal with emerging  economic problems. This has been the case
particularly with the exchange rate system. In the "high case" scenario,  it is assumed that
indeed the country would resort to a more aggressive adjustment approach of implementing
appropriate policies that would encourage  investment and growth in the medium term. In
particular,  the high case assumes the abolition of the multiple exchange rate system currently
in place and the unification of the exchange rate in the second half of the year 2003 and early
part of 2004, and the achievement of current account convertibility during the same period.
4.1.  Base Case Scenario:  Gradual Liberalization
The base case is a scenario of low productivity  growth, low GDP growth, increasing
pressure on the balance of payments, higher levels of external debt, and moderate to high and
variable inflation (see, table 2).8
The base case scenario assumes that the policy makers will not implement
immediately a broad-based adjustment policy package, but will continue with the "gradualist"
strategy followed so far. Under the circumstances, it is likely that macroeconomic  and
structural policies would not be fully synchronized, which would limit growth and the
possibilities to bring down inflation. In the base case scenario, GDP growth not exceeding  2.5
percent per annum and inflation of not less than 25 percent on average during the period
2003-2007 are the most likely outcomes.
A key feature of the "gradualist" approach is the maintenance of the multiple foreign
exchange  system currently in force. Nevertheless,  it is reasonable to expect that given the
pressure from international institutions and other donors, the policy makers would build upon
recent foreign exchange liberalization measures and continue along a slow and gradual path
of further reforms. Because of limited pass-through effects of higher Sum border prices into
higher farm gate prices for cotton and wheat,  the short-run supply response associated with
the "gradual" approach to further foreign exchange  liberalization could be limited. Thus,
export volume growth is not expected to dramatically pick up during the period in question.
Gold and cotton production and exports volumes,  where external  factors have a dominant
influence,  are assumed to remain at their current levels. Taking into consideration the
developments  in trading partner economies and the disincentive effects of the prevailing
exchange rate regime, manufacturing and related other exports are likely to remain less
buoyant, especially toward the latter part of the period 2003-2007.  Given the trends in cotton
and gold prices, nominal export growth is projected to stabilize around 4.0 percent per annum
after 2005.
Several factors affect the level and composition  of merchandise imports under the
"gradualist" strategy.  On the one hand, relatively lower GDP growth under the base case
4 The scenarios and the simulation results are purely exploratory  and are intended for illustrative purposes only.9
scenario is likely to dampen import demand.  On the other, the continuation  of the present
exchange rate system is likely to somewhat encourage  imports. Under these conditions,
following recent practice,  the policy makers are most likely to resort to administrative
measures to contain the level and type of imports.  Consequently,  import volume growth is
assumed to be lower than GDP growth and imports are expected to rise somewhat only
towards the latter part of the period. Given the anticipated  changes in import prices, nominal
imports are projected  to increase by about 4 percent per annum after 2005. Thus, the trade
balance under the base case scenario is unlikely to improve and will remain around  -1.4
percent of GDP during the period.  If account is taken of the interest payments on external
debt arising from the need to borrow externally to cover the resource gap, the current account
of the balance of payments would gradually  decline to over -4.0 percent of GDP by 2007.  It
is also noteworthy that there is no significant reduction in debt service payments  until the end
of the period in question.
The "gradualist" path is unlikely to attract a great deal of foreign direct investments or
significantly abate the current capital flight. Apparently,  in the recent past, "gradualism" does
not seem to have persuaded bilateral and multilateral  donors to commit more resources to
Uzbekistan.  Relatively  lower levels of multilateral and bilateral flows are  likely to induce the
policy makers to continue to undertake  external  commercial borrowing at high cost. Even if
the multilateral and bilateral  flows remain more or less at current levels, there still would
remain a need for further external financing, which can come from only commercial  sources.
Under the "base case"  scenario, the need to provide fiscal relief to fixed income
groups, among other things, is likely to result in higher budget deficits.  The overall budget
deficit is projected to reach a level of -3.5 of GDP in 2005 from a level of-2.1 percent in
2002. It is likely that this deficit will worsen  in years  after 2005 if the current fiscal stance is10
continued.  Monetization of this deficit is likely as foreign financing is unlikely to be
forthcoming on a large scale, as mentioned before. As a result, monetary growth is expected
to be high (about 30 percent on average during the period) and inflation (about 25 percent on
average) would be moderate to high and variable as efforts to establish tighter discipline is
likely to be undermined by the lack of adequate structural adjustment in the real sectors.
4.2.  Eigm (Cse  $cenErcio:  AcceReraited  Refoirmns
The High Case scenario is one of accelerated reforms.  In particular, it is assumed that
the foreign exchange  liberalization begun in the year 2000 would be followed at long last by
the unification of the exchange  rate and implementation of current account convertibility by
the end of 2003 and beginning of 2004 (see, chart 1).  It is also expected that fiscal and
monetary policies would be tight enough in order to rapidly bring inflation under control. The
fiscal stance would need to be focused on prudent public sector deficits and borrowing with a
view to achieving lasting improvements  in debt and debt service ratios. Furthermore,  other
consistent and complementary  accompanying  social and structural policies (including, among
others,  policies related to directed credits, excessive  state participation  in production and
marketing, improving private  sector development,  etc) are expected to be an integral part of
an aggressive policy reform package.
If the a broad-based policy program is implemented, GDP growth rates of 5 percent
per arnum towards the latter part of the period 2003-2007 are well within the capacity of the
Uzbek economy.  Improved incentives are expected to raise investments  and productivity in
agriculture,  thus leading to higher incomes for the rural sector.  Complementary reforms in the
business environment-accelerated  privatization,  and improvements in the competitive
environment-would  lead to rapid growth of small enterprises  and job growth.11
In this scenario, gross domestic investment is assumed to rise gradually  from a level of
19 percent of GDP in 2002 to about 23 percent by 2007.  Government investment  is expected
to decline gradually to make room for private sector investment. While the overall investment
will be financed by foreign savings in the initial years,  national savings will have a relatively
larger contribution in the later years of the period.
Exchange market and other structural  reforms are bound to unleash "repressed"
inflationary pressures.  Thus, the Uzbek policy makers would need to tighten fiscal and
monetary policies not only to contain but also rapidly reduce inflation. The high case scenario
assumes that such fiscal  and monetary tightening at the outset (and prudent policy
adjustments thereafter)  would enable to bring down inflation gradually to a level of 15 percent
by 2005 and to about 8 percent per annum by 2007.
Inflation control, among other things, has also an important implication to welfare,
which is reflected  in this framework in consumption.  Under the "gradualist" approach, some
improvements in consumption  are possible, but these are bound to be erratic and uneven over
the years, depending on a variety of considerations, including the policy makers ability to
adjust the economy to "smooth" consumption.  Under the "high" case, however,  a more
comprehensive  and broad-based coordinated policy stance is likely to result in more
consistent and durable  gains in consumption, especially  after the year 2005.
Accelerated exchange  market reforms are expected to provide a big boost to export-
oriented sectors and consequently the medium term balance of payments prospects are bound
to improve substantially.  These prospects are largely determined by cotton, gold, and other
exports and interest payments  on external  debt. Given the cropping cycle in the cotton sector,
the supply response to the increased  incentives  and ensuing increases  in exports are likely to12
take 1-2 years. Thus, only a moderate increase in cotton exports may be possible during the
initial years of accelerated reforns.  However,  as a result of the improved policy
environment, the share of manufacturing and other non-traditional exports in total exports
should increase substantially.  In sum, export volume growth is projected to increase gradually
to nearly  4 percent by the year 2005.
Throughout the period 2003-2007,  imports are assumed to grow somewhat faster than
GDP largely because of the rise in aggregate  investment and the increasing need for
intermediate  and capital goods imports to sustain higher economic growth. The only probable
exception could be the year 2004 when the full impact of the exchange  rate unification (at a
substantially devalued rate) is likely to constrain import volume growth.  With the slower pick
up in exports in the initial years of this period largely because of structural  constraints,  the
resource balance and the current account deficit are expected to somewhat deteriorate.
However,  towards the end of the period, the current account balance would improve relatively
to a level of about  -2.5 percent of GDP by 2007.
In addition, if progress is made in the area of implementing regional integration,  the
enhancement of the government's credibility through an accelerated adjustment program is
likely to attract a great deal of investor enthusiasm. Higher levels of foreign direct investment
would lead to job and productivity  growth in new industries. While the higher import
competition would lead to some rationalization  of the industrial structure with the elimination
of non-competitive  industries, the net gains from growing sectors of the economy would far
outweigh the losses.  The full benefits of these reforms would be seen in the medium- to long-
run, but noticeable gains would be visible in the short-run as well.13
With an improvement in the policy environment, short-term capital outflows
(including capital flight) are assumed to stabilize around US$150  million by 2005.  Taking
into account the net resource flows from long term borrowing and the need for reserve build-
up (the reserve requirements are specified  as approximately 2.8 months of imports of goods,
services and income),  the external financing  gap is estimated to be relatively higher in the
"high" case than in the "base"  case scenario  for the years 2003 and 2004 when exchange rate
reforms are expected  to be implemented.  However,  in the years after 2005, improvements in
exports earnings, direct foreign investment and capital outflows are likely to significantly
reduce the external financing gap in the "high case" scenario.
The government budgetary outcomes in the medium-term  hinge, among other things,
on two crucial considerations:  the path and success of the disinflation program and the path
and level of the exchange  rate adjustment that goes with the latter.  Higher than anticipated
inflation (for example, arising from a devaluation of the currency)  is likely to put pressure on
the budget.  Even if some revenues  go up, higher inflation coupled with increased  demands
for social protection are likely to increase government expenditures. Furthermore, monetary
tightening to control inflation could also work through to higher interest rates, thus pushing
up government's interest payments.  In the light of these conflicting factors, the achievement
of fiscal targets in the "high" case scenario are contingent on the policy makers ability to
maintain a revenue level of roughly over 28 percent of GDP throughout the period and to
gradually reduce expenditures from a level of nearly 30 percent of GDP in 2003 (if not
maintain that level up to about the year 2005). Fiscal fine tuning on these lines should enable
to reduce the budget deficit from a peak of nearly -3.0 percent of GDP in 2004  to about -2.2
percent in 2007.  One important implication of this fiscal stance would be relatively higher
private borrowing to offset substantial external  debt repayments falling due, especially
towards the latter part of the period.14
The improvements in the budget are expected to come from both revenue and
expenditure related sources. On the revenue side, higher growth and expansion of the tax base
with the incorporation of the informnal sector are two contributing factors. The sustenance of
the revenue effort is likely to help defraying expenditures towards transitional social  costs of
foreign exchange  liberalization, which would partly be supported by external aid. The
budgetary consolidation on these lines would reduce the need for financing to a level
compatible  with available non-inflationary financing.  The tight fiscal  stance would also
greatly help monetary management aimed at bringing inflation down to around  15 percent by
2005.
In the medium-term,  full macroeconomic  stability could be attained with low and
stable rates of inflation with relatively low monetary growth.
43.  MIeasurirtng IEmzermal  SurtainnAbnaiy of Alkeir%nodve  Seeorfiio
The three-gap model can address external sustainability issues of a country as it links
domestic  output, export, and import growth, the path of the exchange  rate, and external debt
dynamics in a consistent framework.  Furthernore, the model has the capability to handle
detailed extemal debt transactions of different borrowing  sectors of the domestic economy
from different external lenders.  The model can also be used for analyzing the sensitivity of
different borrowing  strategies available to a country. For example,  it can be used to explore
the balance of payments implications  of borrowing on different concessional  and non-
concessional  terms, from different types of creditors.15
Tables 2 and 3 show the non-interest extemal current account balances for both the
"base"  and "high" case scenarios in US dollar terms and as a ratio to GDP. The non-interest
current account balance in the "base"  case is expected to be on average around -95 million US
dollars,  which is only slightly higher than that for the "high" case. In relative terms, there is a
marginal improvement in the non-interest  current account balance towards the latter part of
the period (2003-2007) due mainly to the relatively higher export growth under the "high"
case scenario. The net outcome in the "high" case is a noteworthy improvement in both the
non-interest and overall current account balances, especially in the latter part of the period.
Some standard indicators for measuring the sustainability  of Uzbekistan's external
debt are given in table 4 and the charts on page 29. Countries with high GDP growth relative
to the real interest rate that they face on their external debt can support initial higher extemal
debt relative to GDP and exports. From this perspective,  the ratio of extemal debt to GDP is a
critical measure for assessing the solvency and creditworthiness  of a country.5 This ratio can
increase for three reasons:  increased resource transfers from the rest of the world to the
borrowing country, interest payments on past debt at a real interest rate higher than the real
growth rate of the economy, or capital losses incurred on outstanding debt as a result of
depreciation of the real exchange  rate.
The chart 2 (page 29)shows that the extemal  debt to GDP ratio is relatively higher in
the "base"  case than in the "high" case. The reason for this is that the extemal financing
requirements in the "high" case are relatively lower than in the "base" case, at least in the
later years  following accelerated reforms. In the "base" case the extemal debt/GDP ratio rises
from 68 percent to 78 during the period 2003-2007.  In contrast,  in the "high" case, this ratio
nThe  debt-GDP ratio measures the debt  in terms of home goods.  If the relative value of home goods  falls (increases), as in the case after a
real depreciation  (appreciation),  the debt-GDP ratio will rise (fall).  Against that must be set offthe favorable  (unfavorable) impact of  the real
devaluation  (appreciation)  on exports,  an important determinant  of creditworthiness.16
rises to 74 percent at the end of the same period. Compared with ratios for other countries,
these figures for both scenarios may not be "alarming".  In the absence of any concrete
benchmarks, we compare these ratios with an "internationally"  used guideline (around  60
percent).
The debt service to GDP (or exports) indicator helps to identify bunching of
repayments and/or liquidity problems that a country faces in repaying its external obligations.
The charts given on page 29 show that under both scenarios the debt service  to exports ratio is
relatively lower than an "internationally"  accepted "threshold"  (approximately,  25 percent).
However,  the ratio is relatively higher for the "base" case towards the latter part of the period
2003-2007. Apparently, an accelerated  reform program with substantial external financing
need not necessarily be accompanied  by a significant escalation of external debt service
payments. This depends crucially on the mix of such financing as well as its conditionality.
The graph on the ratio of debt service to government revenue  shows some adverse
implications to the government budget of a rise in external debt service payments.  In the case
of Uzbekistan, the extent of debt service payments would be a significant element that needs
to be given consideration  in the design of an appropriate economic adjustment  program.
While these debt and debt service ratios are not alarming in comparison with other
countries in the FSU, they suggest that Uzbekistan's external debt position will have to be
closely monitored,  even under a fairly "high"  case policy setting.17
5.0  Some  Conclusions
This study reports on an internally  consistent macroeconomic  framework that focuses
on the major imbalances of the economy for evaluating some of the policy choices facing
Uzbekistan. It lays emphasis  on both the domestic  and the external factors that determine
economic performance.  The study also attempts to quantify the relative  importance of
external financing and the sustainability of the balance of payments  under alternative
structural adjustment  paths facing Uzbekistan.  Two  somewhat "polar" policy  alternatives are
analyzed using the model. The "base"  case of "gradual" reforms  is associated  with low
growth, low investment, high and variable inflation, lower inflows of direct foreign
investment,  and rather low per capita consumption  growth. The basic assumption underlying
the "high" case is that the country will carry out a comprehensive  set of structural adjustment
policies to eliminate the distortions in the economy.  In particular, under this scenario,
exchange market reforms are expected to be a major element of public policy. The "high"
case entails  a persistence of inflation especially  after the exchange  market reforms (but a rapid
disinflation thereafter)  and higher external borrowing in the initial years of the period in
question. Nevertheless,  the external exposure indicators under the "high" case turn out to be
relatively better than those related to the "base" case, especially towards the latter part of the
period.
The three-gap  framework presented here is rather rudimentary  and is intended as a
first step toward a more comprehensive qualitative and quantitative  assessment of the
adjustment alternatives  facing Uzbekistan.  Even this  rudimentary framework  is capable of
highlighting the policy choices  that are critical  in the determination of the creditworthiness
and external sustainability.  It appears that liberalization  of the foreign exchange  system is a
key element of a broad-based  reform package to promote growth and development of the
Uzbek economy.18
llne Accounting  IFrarnewoirK of the "Thiree-Gap"  modlel
The Uzbekistan model consists of two modules:  the flow of funds module (FOF), and
a external debt module (DM). The basic version contains four economic agents or "sectors":
Central Governnent, the Monetary System (Central Bank and Deposit Money Banks), the
"Private" Sector? (or more appropriately,  the"Rest of the Economy,"  including households
and private firms, non-central government  agencies, public enterprises, and non-monetary
financial institutions) and the Foreign Sector.
Equations of the model
The savings-investment gap:
Y  - (Cg + Cp)  - ( Ig + Ip)  =  X - IM  (1)
The foreign exchange  gap:
X - IM +  NFY +  NCT  + KTfg + DFI + POR + NLT + NST + dRES = GAPF  (2)
The fiscal gap:
NTXpg + Td + (Ti - Sub) +  NCTfg  +  NFfg  +  NFgp + Krev - Ig - NKTRgp  =
=  Lmg + Lpg + KTfg + NLTfg  + NSTfg  (3)
The monetary sector flows are summarized by equation  (4) below:
L,p +  Lmg + dRES  =  dM + dNOL  (4)
The model consists of 4 equations and 33 variables.7 To obtain a numerical  solution
(33-4) variables should be assigned values. In order to prepare for a numerical  solution, we
endogenize a number of important variables by specifying  several appropriate behavioral
equations. Some of these are discussed below in the section on behavioral structure of the
6 In this  framework, the so-called  'Private Sector'  should be interpreted as a residual sector consisting  households, corporate sector, and
public sector institutions not  included in  the "government"  sector defined within  the framework.
7The 5a equation of the system, i.e.  that for the private sector  is redundant according to Walras'  law.19
model.  For the remainder,  we adopt a number of different methods of exogenously specifying
the expected values for the variables.
Some behavioral equations  of the model
The money  demand function:
M  =  P  y  t  v  (5)
The investment/output relation:
I(t)  =  ICOR(t+1)  *  [y(t+l)  - y(t)]  (6)
Private consumption function:
Cp  =c  *(Y-T  +  NCTR  +  NFY)  (7)
Import functions:
IMi  =  f(ye, RERi)  (8)
Manufacturing exports function:
Xm =  f(yf, RERm)  (9)
Other exports:
Xi  =  (1+gxi)  * Xi(t-1)  (10)
The model can be solved using one of two approaches.  First, all resource flows could
be specified exogenously and the model could then be solved for the implied growth and
inflation rates.8 Second, resource requirements (including the additional foreign exchange
needs) could be estimated  for given growth and inflation assumptions. We have adopted the
latter approach for computational convenience.  Either approach could be considered as a first
step in an process that converges  to a feasible solution to the model.9
This is also referred  to as the "availabilities"  approach  to solution of this type of model.
9 Since no explicit objective function  is  used, the solution  is best described  as a feasible one. The importance of iteration in this process
cannot be overemphasized.20
To evaluate the external sustainability of the country, a module that incorporates
external debt information supplements the flow-of-funds  framework.  This enables the
calculation of the debt servicing capacity of a country taking into account the existing stock of
external  debt and changes  in that stock as a result of new extemal borrowing.
AppDeimdit  2.
SyMnblls used.
Y  - Gross domestic product at market prices
C  - Total consumption
I  - Gross domestic fixed capital formation (investnent)
X  - Export of goods and services
im  - Imports of goods and services.
NFY  - Net factor income
NCT  - Net current transfers
KT1f  Capital transfers  to government from abroad
DFI  - Direct foreign investment
POR  - Portfolio investment
NLT  - Net long-term borrowing
NST  - Net short-term borrowing
dRES  - Change in extemal reserves
GAPF  - Financing requirements  for closing the balance of payments gap.'I
Td  - Direct taxes
Ti  - Indirect taxes
Sub  - Subsidies
NCTfg  - Net foreign current transfers to govemment
For simplicity,  government and private sector flows have been aggregated to show NFY,NCT,NLT,NST on a net basis. Note also that the
flow-of-funds  matrix in table 2 contain more details than shown in the equations in the text.21
NTXpg  - Non-tax revenue of government
NFfg  - Net foreign factor payments by government
NCTgp  - Net current transfers from government  to private  sector
NFgp  - Net factor payments by government to private sector
NFgm  - Net factor payments by government to monetary sector
Cg  - Government consumption
Krev  - Capital revenue
Ig  - Government investment
NKTRgp-  Net private capital transfers of government
Lmg  - Government sector borrowing from the monetary sector
NLTfg  - Net long-term borrowing  from abroad
NSTfg  - Net short-term borrowing from abroad
KTfg  - Net foreign capital transfers
Lpg  - Net government borrowing from the private  sector
Lmp  - Private sector borrowing from the monetary  sector: i.e. change in the stock
of domestic credit to the private sector (DCp)
Lmg  - Government sector borrowing from the monetary sector: i.e. change in the
stock of domestic credit to the government  sector (DCg)
dNOL - Change in net other liabilities of the monetary system (NOL)
M  - Broad money  (M2)
dM  - Change in broad money stock
P  - Price level
y  - Real GDP at market prices
v  - Velocity of circulation  of broad money.
ICOR  - Incremental  capital-output ratio
c  - Propensity to consume22
NCTR - Net current transfers in real terms received by the rest of the
economy from the other sectors
Imi  - Demand for ith import category;l 
RERi  - Real exchange  rate for the ith import category
Xm  - Exports of manufacturing goods
Yf  - Proxy for trading partners income level
RERm  - Real exchange  rate for manufactures.
gxi  - exogenously given growth rate of export category i.
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Table  1: Uzbekistan - Selected Indicators
1997  1998  1999Y  2UUU  SUUil  -Zuul
Main macroeconomic  aggregates
Atnuualgrowth rates (from constantprice data)  I
GDP (mp)  per capita  3.2  2.6  2.8  2.7  3.2  1.6
Total consumption per capita  5.5  i}6  i13.1  18,.  u  5.3
GDP at market  prices  5.2  4.3  4.3  3.8  4.5  3.0
Total consumption  7.5  tS.5  15.3  19.2  16.8  3.8
Gross domestic  investmet (DD)  ..  15.0  2.0  1.0  3.7  3.0
Exports  (GNFS)  3.2  -15.4  -8.1  9.2  -5.4  -u.]
of  w4ich Goods  3.1  -17.4  -10.9  1.6  -6.9
u-l-pO  s  (GNFSJ  -7.2  -22.8  -8.0  -5.8  6.4  0.5
of wich Goods  -10.5  -26.3  -12.4  -3.4  3.7
Savings-investment haanLe-,  --  -- ertn-u-c  .If  C--P
Gross Domestic  investmnent  22.8  16.9  17.8  14.0  19.3  19.4
of which Government investment  7.4  6.7  6.6  5.9  5.0  4.8
Foreign savings  5.5  1.0  1.5  -2.7  1.5  0.8
Gross  national  savings  17.3  15.9  16.3  16.8  17.8  18 6
Goverranem savings  5.2  4.5  4.7  5.7  5.1  5  5.5
| Nongovernmentnsavings  12.2  11.4  11.6  11.1  12.6  13.1
Gross domestic  savings  18.7  16.5  17.3  19.4  19.9  19.8
Otf,er
GDOP  inflation  66.1  39.0  4-4.1  47.3  43.1  39.1
Annual average exchange  rate (LCU/US$)  91.2  132.2  245.6  416.7  652.0  800.0
Terms  oftrade index  (YR97  -100)  113.2  111.7  110.6  116.5  116.2  116.6
Money  growth  45.6  28.1  32.1  37.1  54.3  44.6
Government  finance  imdicators
Percentage of GP
Total revenues, ofwhich  30.8  31.3  29.4  28.3  26.5  27.1
Tax rrvenues  27.7  29.4  27.9  26.4  24.0  25.6
Total expenditures, of which  32.5  34.5  32.0  30.4  27.8  29.21
Consutnption  20.5  20.5  20.6  18.7  18.4  18.4
Deficit(-y/Surplus(+)  -i.1  -2  42.6  -2. I  -I.4  -. 1
Total  Goverment Debt  I 8.5  22.0  24.8  37.2  53.9  60.2
External debt &  liquidity indicators
Total  DOD  and TDS
DOD (US$  millions)  2781.4  3213.2  4773.6  4372.8  4626.3  470S.
DOD/GDPmpratio  26.0  30.0  55.1  56.0  62.0  53.9
tD  u3S  milliore)  511.9  348.8  553.6  853.6  833.5  914.
TDS/exports(XGS)ratio  12.8  10.2  17.5  25.2  25.9  27.7
Total  gross reserves  (months'  imDorts G&S)  3.0  3.9  4.5  4.8  4.3  4.0
External  financing
(USS, miiGons)
Official  capital grants  0.0  -50.0  -14.0  -50.0  -8.0  -65.0
Priate  invecsnent  (nel)  167.0  140.0  121.0  75.0  83.0  85.0
Net Long term borrowingexcl  IMF  166.7  617.8  1112.3  161.3  237.4  69.0
Adjustments  to scheduled  debt service  0.0  7.0  1  5.0  -2.0  0.0  0.0 {  All other capital  flows  -230.2  -610.8  -1009.3  -300.8  -161.4  -146.6
Notes:  I .The indicators  given here were assembled  from a varety of sources, both official  and nonofficial.
This  may have caused consistency problerms  of figures over the  period convered.
2.  Figures for 2002 are  based on early estimates that  are available  in April,  2003.25
Table 2: Uzbekistan -Macroecononiic  Scenarios
Scenario Indicators.  - Etimate  r  Base Case  -
,,,,_,,; .i.,;,i,,-, !.t  ',  '>  "  '  "  '.  /'-  1-'';-%  io2002  21_031  20041  20051'  :200617  2007
GDP Growth(%)  3.0  2.2  2.3  2.4  2.5  2.5
Consumption (per capita)  Growth (%)  0.0  0.1  0.7  0.8  0.9  0.9
Gross Domestic Investment  (%  ofGDP)  19.4  19.2  19.2  19.2  19.2  19.2
Inflation (annual GDP deflator change:%)  39.1  30.0  28.0  25.0  25.0  25.0
Broad Money Growth(%)  44.6  48.1  30.9  28.0  28.1  28.1
FISCAL OPERATIONS
Overall  Fiscal Balance (%  of GDP)  -2.1  -2.6  -2.8  -3.5  -4.4  -4.9
Primary Fiscal  Balance (% of GDP)  -1.6  -2.0  -2.1  -2.8  -3.4  -3.3
Total  govt. expenditures (% of GDP)  29.2  29.8  30.3  31.5  32.5  33.0
Current  govt. expenditures (% of  GDP)  21.5  22.8  23.4  24.5  25.6  26.0
Govt.  interest payments  (%  of GDP)  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.7  1.1  1.5
Govt. total  revenues (% of GDP)  27.1  27.2  27.5  28.0  28.1  28.1
Total  debt service (BOP)/Gov.  Revenue (%)  38.7  42.5  34.7  30.6  33.1  30.2
EXTERNAL  SECTOR
Current Ac Balance  (Mln US$)  -71.0  -202.8  -302.3  -382.9  431.2  -492.1
Current Ac Balance (%  GDP)  -0.8  -2.4  -3.2  -3.6  -3.9  -4.3
Non-interest  Current Ac Bal (% GDP)  1.0  -0.4  -1.0  -1.2  -1.0  -1.7
Trade Balance (Mln US$)  -103.7  -105.1  -102.1  -131.1  -139.1  -147.4
Trade Balance (% GDP)  -1.2  -1.4  -1.2  -1.4  -1.4  -1.4
Gapfill  financing requirements  (Mln US$)  0.0  178.0  287.9  342.0  354.5  411.6
Debt Service/Exports  GNFS+IR+WR (%)  a)  27.7  25.8  23.1  22.5  24.5  22.4
Debt Service/GDP  (%)  10.5  11.5  9.5  8.6  9.3  8.5
Interest payments/Exports  GNFS+IR+WR (%)  4.9  5.0  6.0  7.3  8.5  7.9
Interest payments/GDP (%)  1.9  2.2  2.5  2.8  3.2  3.0
Total  DOD/GDP(%)  53.9  68.0  69.2  71.6  78.6  86.1
Export Volume Growth (%, annual) -GNFS  0.0  2.0  2.1  2.1  2.3  2.3
Imnport Volume Growth  (%, annual) -GNFS  0.0  0.2  2.2  2.3  2.5  2.5
Nominal Export Growth (%, annual)  --GNFS  0.0  4.9  3.9  3.3  4.0  4.0
Nominal  Import Growth (%, annual) --GNFS  0.0  4.8  3.6  4.1  4.1  4.0
Some  key Assumptions
Direct foreign  investment (Min US$)  85  80  80  82  85  85
Capital outflow (Min US$)  -155  -192  -154  -200  -200  -200
Foreign res. (months of imp.of GNFS & income)  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8
Cotton price (cts/lb)  b)  46.2  58.0  62.0  65.0  66.0  67.0
Goldprice($/troyoz)_b)  310.0  320.0  300.0  280.0  283.9  287.8
Notes:
a) Exports GNFS+IR+WR include  goods, services, income receipts and workers rernittances
b) Source of information  on cotton and gold price projections: The World Bank26
Table 3: Uzbekistan  -Macroeconomic  Scenarios
Scenario Indicators  Estimate  High Case
2002  20031  20041  20051  2006  2007
GDP  Growth(%)  3.0  2.5  3.5  4.5  5.0  5.0
Consurmption  (per capita) Growth (%)  0.0  -0.3  0.3  0.2  3.2  3.0
Gross  Domestic Investment (%  of GDP)  19.4  20.0  21.0  23.0  23.0  23.0
Inflation  (annual  GDP  deflator change:%)  39.1  30.0  30.0  15.0  10.0  8.0
Broad Money Growth(%)  44.6  48.5  34.5  20.2  15.5  13.4
FISCAL OPERATIONS
Overall  Fiscal Balance (% of GDP)  -2.1  -2.6  -2.9  -2.7  -2.5  -2.2
Primnary Fiscal Balance (%  of GDP)  -1.6  -2.1  -2.2  -1.8  -1.6  -1.4
Total  govt. expenditures (% of GDP)  29.2  29.8  30.4  30.7  30.6  30.3
Current govt. expenditures (% of GDP)  21.5  22.8  23.5  23.7  23.4  23.1
Govt. interest payments (%  of GDP)  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.9  0.8  0.8
Govt. total revenues (%  ofGDP)  27.1  27.2  27.5  28.0  28.1  28.1
Total debt service (BOP)/Gov. Revenue  (%)  38.7  42.3  33.6  29.2  30.1  ,25.4
EXTERNAL SECTOR
Current Ac Balance (Min US$)  -71.0  -228.1  -298.3  -324.1  -313.2  -315.7
Current Ac Balance (% GDP)  -0.8  -2.8  -3.1  -3.1  -2.7  -2.5
Non-interest  Current Ac Bal (%  GDP)  1.0  -0.7  -1.0  -1.1  -0.8  -1.2
Trade Balance  (Min US$)  -103.7  -129.3  -89.8  -127.9  -108.7  -75.0
Trade Balance (%  GDP)  -1.2  -1.7  -1.0  -1.3  -1.1  -0.7
Gapfill  financing requirements  (MIn US$)  0.0  209.1  277.8  215.7  160.5  154.0
Debt Service/Exports  GNFS+IR+WR  (%)  a)  27.7  25.8  23.0  20.7  21.6  18.3
Debt Service/GDP  (%)  10.5  11.5  9.2  8.2  8.5  7.2
Interest paymnents/Exports  GNFS+IR+WR (%)  4.9  5.0  5.9  5.8  5.8  4.4
Interest payments/GDP  (%)  1.9  2.2  2.4  2.3  2.3  1.7
Total  DOD/GDP(%)  53.9  68.6  67.7  70.7  72A4  73.6
Export Volume Growth (%, annual) - GNFS  0.0  2.0  2.2  3.9  4.2  4.5
Irnport  Volumne Growth (%, annual) --GNFS  0.0  1.0  1.5  4.0  4.0  4.0
Nominal  Export Growth  (%, annual) --GNFS  0.0  4.9  4.0  5.5  6.3  6.6
Norninal  Imnport Growth  (%, annual) --GNFS  0.0  5.7  2.5  6.5  5.5  5.5
Some  key Assumptions
Direct foreign investment (Mn US$)  85  80  80  102  115  125
Capital  outflow (Mln US$)  -155  -192  -154  -150  -150  -150
Foreign  res. (months of imp.of GNFS & income)  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8
Cotton  price (cts/lb)_b)  46.2  58.0  62.0  65.0  66.0  67.0
Gold price ($/troy oz)  b)  310.0  320.0  300.0  280.0  283.9  287.8
Notes:
a)  Exports GNFS+IR+WR  include goods, services,  income receipts  and workers remittances
b) Source of informnation  on  cotton and gold price projections: The World Bank27
Table 4: Uzbekistan - Debt Exposure Indicators (%), 2003-2006
ln-dkitors  2003-  - 2004  - 2005%s-; ;>0g6
TDS/XGNFS
Base Case  25.8  23.1  22.5  24.5
Empirical  crisis threshold  25.0  25.0  25.0  25.0
High  Case  25.8  23.0  20.7  21.6
TDS/REV
Base Case  42.5  34.7  30.6  33.1
Empirical  crisis threshold  30.0  30.0  30.0  30.0
High  Case  42.3  33.6  29.2  30.1
DOD/GDP
Base Case  68.0  69.2  71.6  78.6
Maastficht criterion  60.0  60.0  60.0  60.0
High Case  68.6  67.7  70.7  72.4
Notes:
TDS - total debt service payments
XGNFS  - exports of goods, services, income and workers rernittances
DOD -debt outstanding and disbursed28
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OFFI  - Official exchange rate
CURB  - Curb market exchange rate
COMM  - Commercial exchange  rate
EBBY  - Exchange Bureau buying rate
EBSL  - Exchange Bureau selling rate
AALL  - Aggregate Average  exchange rate29
Chart 2: Uzbekistan -Debt Exposure Indicators, 2003-2006
(Base & High Case Scenarios)
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